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ABSTRACT
Personal information about applicants is often requested by service providers to be used as an input of a classification 
process establishing the specific situation of each applicant. This is a prerequisite for the service provider to make an 
appropriate offer to the applicant. For example, the rate and duration of personal loans are usually adapted depending on 
the risk based on the income, the assets or past lines of credits of the borrower. In the eyes of privacy laws and directives, 
the set of exposed documents collected to achieve a service must be restricted to the minimum necessary. This Limited
Data Collection principle reduces the impact of data breaches both in the interest of service providers and customers. In 
this article, we show that in practice, the data collected traditionally is excessive. We propose a new approach that we call 
Minimum Exposure, where the minimum set of documents required can be computed on the user’s side. We formalize the 
underlying problem and show it is NP hard. We propose algorithms to compute a solution and validate them with 
experiments. The Minimum Exposure approach leads to a very significant reduction of the quantity of personal 
information exposed, therefore leading to important privacy gains for the applicant and large scale savings for service 
providers in the event of data breaches. 
1. INTRODUCTION
A massive digitalization of personal information is currently underway. Individuals are receiving an 
ever increasing amount of important documents in digital form (financial, professional, medical, 
relative to insurance, administrative, linked to daily consumption, etc.), issued by their employers, 
banks, insurances companies, civil authorities, hospitals, schools, ISP, telcos, etc.
In parallel, secured online personal stores are emerging, like Adminium1 or Securibox2. The domain 
of the personal cloud is flourishing, and a recent report forecasts a $12 billion market3. Alternative 
offers propose storage facilities on the user’s side with extended privacy controls, like for example 
Plug servers4, Personal Data Servers [6], Nori5, or Personal Data Ecosystem6. This thriving market 
                                                     
1 See http://www.adminium.fr/  
2 See http://www.securibox.fr/ 
3
The Personal Cloud: Transforming Personal Computing, Mobile, And Web Markets, Frank Gillett, a Forrester report, June 2011.
4 See http://freedomboxfoundation.org/ 
5 See http://www.projectnori.org/
6 See http://personaldataecosystem.org/ 
attests a reality: official documents are continuously accumulated and treasured by their owner. The 
reason is simple: legal obligations require them to be kept (e.g., 1 year for bank statements) and 
these documents are used as evidence when performing subsequent administrative tasks (e.g., 
paying taxes) or applying to services (e.g., applying for a loan).   
Indeed, many services are calibrated to adapt to the particular situation of each applicant. For 
example, the characteristics of a personal loan (rate, duration, insurance fee…) are defined 
according to proofs of income, employment, title deeds, personal references, forms of collateral, 
medical records, past lines of credits, etc. To cite other examples, contracting an insurance (health, 
car, job protection, etc.), social assistance or tax refund, also require providing evidence of one’s 
specific situation.
Although privacy intrusive, the necessity of evaluating the particular situation of an applicant is 
unquestionable and is in the interest of both the service provider and the customer. However, the 
requested set of documents must be restricted to the minimum required to take the correct decision. 
First, the reason is to protect the privacy of the applicant. Privacy legislations and directives 
worldwide enacted the Limited Data Collection (LDC) principle to this end: this principle states that 
organizations should only collect the personal data strictly required to achieve a goal the user 
consents to [17], [31], [36]. The second reason is to limit the cost of information leakage. Indeed, all 
too often personal data ends up being disclosed by negligence or hack. Since the beginning of 2011, 
the Open Security Foundation7 has already reported 322 data loss incidents affecting 126 millions 
records. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse8 has tracked 275 data breaches with a total of more than 
20 million records involved. This is not only a serious privacy incident, but also a potential 
financial disaster for the companies in charge of the data. A recent study [33] estimates the cost of 
data breaches for US companies at an average $7.2million per incident and it has kept increasing 
since 2006. In addition, The New York Times reports that 90% of companies have experienced at 
least one data breach last year9. Moreover, data breach laws have been adopted in many countries10.
They compel companies to notify data owners in the event of data breaches, assist the victims in 
minimizing the impact of the data leak (e.g., canceling their credit card if the number has been 
disclosed) and often incur financial compensations. Security companies have created online breach 
cost calculators11 to draw attention to this phenomenon: the more data exposed, the greater the cost 
in the event of a data breach.
The target of this paper is precisely to restrict the set of documents to expose to third parties to a 
minimum subset, in accordance with the LDC principle. Existing works have already transposed 
this legal principle to data management systems. Hippocratic databases maintain the set of attributes 
that are required for each purpose [3]. However, this solution assumes that the data useful and 
useless to reach a given purpose can be distinguished a priori (at collection time). This assumption 
holds for simple cases, e.g., when ordering online, the address of the customer is mandatory to 
deliver the purchased items. However, it does not hold in many cases. What data is useful to come 
                                                     
7 See http://www.datalossdb.org/ 
8 See http://www.privacyrights.org/ 
9 The New York Times BITS. June 22, 2011. By Riva Richmond. Security Professionals Say Network Breaches Are Rampant.  
10
 In EU (European Parliament legislative resolution, 6 May 2009), in 46 states in US (http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/telecommunications-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx), etc. 
11 See http://databreachcalculator.com.sapin.arvixe.com/ 
to the decision of lowering the rate of the loan proposed to a user? Not only does the information 
harvesting depend on the purpose, it also depends on the data itself. Consider a reduction of rate 
based on either the salary or the assets of an individual. Revealing her income of $30.000 if her age 
is below 25 may be enough. But an income of $50.000 would suffice, regardless of age. Maybe 
both the income and age values are useless if sufficient assets (e.g., greater than $100.000) can be 
justified. For a user with values u1=[income=$35.000, age=21, assets=$10.000] the minimum data 
set would be [income, age]. For a user with u2=[income=$40.000, age=35, assets=$250.000] it 
would be [assets]. Hence, the bank cannot specify a minimum set of attributes needed to make its 
decision since this decision depends on looking at the entire attributes available. Therefore, fixing 
the data to be collected a priori inevitably leads to over-estimating the data to be collected, so as to 
cover all the information which may turn out to be of use at some point in the decision process.  
This illustrates what we call the limited data collection paradox expressed as follows: third parties 
require users to reveal data in order to determine whether this data is required to achieve the 
expected purpose. To the best of our knowledge, all the existing techniques implementing LDC do 
not escape falling into this paradox. We further position our work with respect to previous studies in 
Section 6. 
In this paper, we propose a strategy to strictly comply with the LDC principle, while alleviating the 
paradox and solving the above problems. Our solution is based on a novel concept, that we call 
Minimum Exposure which is a reverse implementation of the traditional LDC strategy, where 
individuals are given enough knowledge to determine on their side the minimum set of data to 
expose to achieve the expected service with maximum benefit.  
Our contribution is threefold. First, we formalize the Minimum Exposure optimization problem. 
Second, we study the complexity of the problem, prove it is NP-Hard and discuss approximation 
algorithms. Third, we validate our proposal with experiments illustrating important reductions of 
the information to be exposed. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the general scenario, and presents a running 
example used along the paper. In Section 3, we state the Minimum Exposure optimization problem, 
prove it is NP-Hard and study its complexity. Several algorithms are introduced in Section 4, and 
validated in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the related work and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. SCENARIO FOR MINIMUM EXPOSURE 
2.1 General Scenario
We consider the general scenario depicted in Figure 1 which involves three main parties: Data 
Producers, Users, and Service Providers. Data Producers act as data sources. They include for 
example banks, employers, hospitals, or administrations. The information they deliver to users has 
an official value and is signed to prove integrity and origin (e.g., salary forms, bank records history, 
tax receipts, etc.). Users store the documents they receive in their personal digital spaces. We make 
here no hypothesis on users’ personal space, which could be their own PC, cloud storage, secure 
personal devices, etc. Service Providers may include banks or insurances companies, but also 
public welfares or administrations. They propose customized services like bank loans, health 
insurance, social benefits, etc. 
We call Minimum Exposure (ME) the process which identifies the minimum subset of documents
produced by Data Producers to be exposed by a User to a Service Provider to trigger the desired
service with the (set of) advantage(s) she can (and wants) to obtain. ME requires confronting (1) the 
set of documents owned by the user, with (2) the advantages, associated with collection rules
























Figure 1. General architecture enabling Minimum Exposure. 
The execution of ME must take place on the user’s side or on any third party trusted by the user, to
escape the LDC paradox: indeed, the system in charge of running ME –including the service 
provider itself– would need to collect more documents than the minimum subset computed by ME.
The general scenario is thus as follows. When a user wants to obtain a service, she (1) downloads 
collection rules published by the service provider, (2) computes locally the advantages she can
obtain based on the documents she owns, (3) selects among the advantages the ones she desires to 
obtain, (4) uses ME to compute the minimum set of documents to expose to obtain the service with 
the selected advantages, (5) exposes these documents to the service provider, where their integrity
and origin are checked. 
2.2 Setting
2.2.1 Collection Rules
The collection rules describe the information required by the service provider and the advantages 
associated with it. Collection rules must (i) be expressive enough to successfully reflect the decision 
making process of the service provider. Indeed, decision making rules are complex in practice, e.g.,
loans are granted based on decision trees, SVM or neural networks [16]. Collection rules must also 
(ii) be comprehensible by humans (end users have to check their appropriateness). Note that 
comprehensibility and justifiability are often required by law, for e.g., credit scoring and computer-
aided medical diagnosis [23]. Rules extraction tools have been designed to obtain comprehensive
rules (e.g., modeled as decision trees) from “black box” decision making models like SVM or 
neural networks [10].
In this paper, we consider that collection rules are modeled using disjunctions of conjunctions of 
constraints on attribute-value pairs. This is a comprehensible rule-based model, which is sufficiently
expressive since it covers the widely used decision tree model [26].
For example, an organization offering loans, e.g., grant Non Interest Loans (NILo) to families and 
young students, could articulate this with the following rule:
NILo: (married=true ? children>0) ? (age<30 ? Edu=’Univ’)
We assume that no-one can force users to transmit documents. The only penalty is to prevent them 
from obtaining advantages. Therefore, rules must be positive, in the sense that it is beneficial for a 
user to trigger them. This is not a limitation of the model since rules leading to constraints that 
prevent the grant of services (called negative rules) can be constructed by integrating the negation 
of the rule into the collection rule set. For example, if the NILo mentioned above is not granted to 
people with a police record (police_record=’YES’??NILo), the rule can be written: 
NILo: (married=true ? children>0 ? police_record=’NO’) ? (age<30 ? Edu=’Univ’ ?
police_record=’NO’)
2.2.2 Users Documents 
The granularity at which data is produced and signed by the data producers has a strong impact on 
the quality of the result of the ME process. In general, each official document is transmitted and 
signed as a whole document. The ME algorithm will then view each document as a set of 
inseparable (attribute, value) pairs, that would all be exposed –or not– to a service provider.
If documents are signed at a finer granularity by data producers, the ME algorithm can process 
(attribute, value) pairs separately, and expose the value of a given attribute, e.g., the annual income, 
without revealing the whole official document, e.g., the income tax receipt, containing this value. 
Although users’ documents are currently signed as a whole (in today's applications there is no need 
for finer granularity), there is no technical difficulty to sign (attribute, value) pairs separately, 
avoiding artificial complexity. In this paper, we focus on signed (attribute, value) pairs. 
To go further, data producers could even sign expressions of the form attribute?? value,?? being the 
comparator <, ?, =, ?, ?, or >. The ME algorithm could thus manipulate attribute?? value triples and 
avoid exposing the precise values of each attribute. The approach we propose when considering 
signed (attribute, value) pairs can be extended to such a context (see Appendix A). 
2.2.3 Metrics to Evaluate the Degree of Exposure 
The minimization of the set of documents resulting from the application of the ME algorithm can be 
appreciated in terms of reduction of the data exposed, harmful to both user (in terms of privacy) and 
service provider (in terms of financial cost).  
We consider on the one hand that the privacy harm associated with a dataset is proportional to the 
usefulness of that dataset, and on the other hand that the cost of a data breach for service providers 
is directly proportional to its exposure. The financial cost for service providers is determined by two 
dominant factors [33]. First, the ex-post response represents 20% of the cost. It includes the actions 
taken by the company to provide assistance to the victims in the necessary procedures conducted to 
minimize the harm: the greater the exposure, the greater the harm. Second, lost business (50% of 
data breach cost) is the direct consequence of the negative publicity associated with the data breach 
incident headings: the greater the exposure, the worse the publicity. These components of the 
breach costs are tightly linked with information loss, and as such are captured by the metric we have 
chosen.
The techniques that we propose can accommodate any metric that associates an exposure value to 
each dataset item independently. This covers many traditional information loss metrics based on 
data entropy, e.g., minimal distortion [34], [35] or ILoss [38].  
2.3 Running Example 
We introduce here the loan scenario, used as a running example (see Table 1) throughout the paper. 
The example has deliberately been simplified, real consumer loan applications often requesting 
hundreds of personal data items12.
An institution proposes, to any applicant, personal loans of $5.000 at 10% rate with 1 year duration 
and a $50 per month insurance cost for job loss protection. But, a higher loan of $10.000 can be 
offered to wealthy customers fulfilling the following requirement:  
(income>$30.000 and assets>$100.000)
or (collateral>$50.000 and life_insurance=’yes’)
Table 1. Collection rules and documents for the Loan Scenario 
Collection rules:
r1: (p1 ? p2 ) ? (p3 ? p4) ? c1
r2: (p5 ? p6 ? p7 ) ? (p4 ? p8 ? p9) ? c2
r3: (p1 ? p6 ? p7 ) ? (p2 ? p4 ? p10) ? c3
r4: (p2 ? p5 ? p6? p7)? (p1 ? p4 ? p8? p9 ) ? c4
with p1: year_income>$30.000, p2: assets>$100.000,
p3: collateral>$50.000, p4: life_insurance=’yes’,
p5: tax_rate>10%, p6: married=true,  
p7: children>0, p8: edu=’university’,














This leads to the first collection rule r1 given in Table 1. Collection rule r2 enables the obtaining of a 
loan granted at only 5% rate for families and low risk factor young people; collection rule r3
expresses that loans can be granted for an extended duration of 2 years to high revenues families 
and to low risk people; and rule r4 states that the insurance cost for job loss protection can be 
proposed with a 30% discount to rich families and promising young workers. Each collection rule is 
made of a disjunction of conjunction of predicates pi of the form attribute ? value, with ? the 
comparator <, ?, =, ?, ?, or >. We consider a user owning a set of attribute = value documents 
                                                     
12 HSBC loans applications are good representatives:  
https://applymort.us.hsbc.com/secure/application/mortgage_equity.hus 
termed doc1 to doc10 such that
13 doci ? pi. This user could then activate the complete set of 
advantages c1 to c4. The ME algorithm has to identify the minimum set of documents allowing this. 
3. THE MINIMUM EXPOSURE PROBLEM 
This section first states the Minimum Exposure problem more formally and studies its complexity. 
3.1 Problem Statement 
We denote by |S| the cardinality of a set S. We introduce below the other required definitions, and 
then state the problem. We illustrate the notions using our running example (see in Table 1). 
3.1.1 Definitions
Attributes. Let A = {ai} represent a finite set of attributes. Each attribute ai has an associated 
domain dom(ai).
Example: A={year_income, assets, collateral, life_insurance, tax_rate, married, children, edu, age, 
insurance_claims} and dom(year_income)=[0;?], dom(married)=Boolean, etc. 
Classes. Let C = {cj} represent a finite set of Boolean variables, interpreted as positive classes to 
which users can belong. If cj=true for a given user, this means she can obtain the advantage 
associated with cj.
Example: C={high_loan, 5%_rate, long_loan, low_insurance}. If c1=true for a given user, then this 
means the user can benefit from receiving a high_loan.
Predicates. We call predicate over A any expression of the form a?v where a?A, v?dom(a) and 
???????????????????}.?
Example: p1: year_income>$30.000 is a predicate. doc6: married=true is also a predicate.
Signed documents. Let doci represent a signed document containing a single equality predicate 
attribute = value over A. We denote by datau={doci} the set of signed documents a given user u can 
expose (i.e., the user already possesses those signed documents or can request them from a data 
producer). We say that a signed document doci proves a predicate p if doci? p. 
Example: doc1: year_income=$35.000 is the signed document which proves predicate p1.
Atomic Rules. An atomic rule leading to class cj,, denoted by atomj is a conjunction of predicates 
such that atomj=true ? cj=true. Since there are usually several atomic rules leading to a class cj we 
write atomj,k using k to distinguish them. 
Example: atom1,1: (year_income>$30.000 ? assets>$100.000) and atom1,2: (collateral>$50.000 ?
life_insurance=‘yes’) are two atomic rules leading to class c1.
                                                     
13 We use implication rather than entailment because (although unlikely) the service provider may decide to give a user a benefit without 
proof. 
We say that a set of signed documents datau={doci} proves an atomic rule atomj,k = ?m  qj,k,m  where 
qj,k,m is a predicate over A, if and only if ?j,k,m ? i : doci? qj,k,m and uniquely proves atomj,k if and 
only if ?j,k,m ?! i : doci? qj,k,m.
Example: datau={doc1, doc2, doc3, doc3} uniquely proves atomic rules atom1,1 and atom1,2.
Collection Rules. A collection rule rj is a disjunction of atomic rules leading to class cj. More 
formally: rj: ?k atomj,k . If a signed set of documents datau proves an atomic rule atomj,k then we say 
that datau proves rj, which means that user u can benefit from the advantage associated with cj
(obviously, rj=true ? cj=true).
Example: r1: (year_income>$30.000 ? assets>$100.000) ? (collateral>$50.000 ?
life_insurance=’yes’) is a collection rule leading to class high_loan.
In what follows, we write rj =?k (?m qj,k,m) where qj,k,m is a predicate over A. Considering r1 in the 
previous example, we have q1,1,1: year_income>$30.000, q1,1,2: assets>$100.000, q1,2,1:
collateral>$50.000 and q1,2,2: life_insurance=’yes’.
Rule Set. Let R = {rj} represent a set of |C| collection rules, one for each class cj. If datau (uniquely) 
proves all the rules of R then we say that datau (uniquely) proves R.
Example: The four collection rules of Table 1 form a rule set. 
Rule Set Boolean Formula. Since only one document uniquely proves a given predicate used in 
the rules, deciding whether datau proves the rule set R is equivalent to testing the truth-value of a 
Boolean formula ER called Rule Set Boolean Formula associated to R constructed as follows:
ER =?j ( ?k?( ?m bf(j,k,m) ) ) 
where f(j,k,m) is a function of domain [1;|A|] defined by [f(j,k,m)=i such that doci? qj,k,m] and bf(j,k,m)
is a Boolean variable which is true if docf(j,k,m) is exposed and false otherwise. Note that if we 
consider the truth assignment that sets all the values bf(j,k,m) to true, then ER=true ? datau proves R.
Example: Table 2(a) illustrates a Rule Set Boolean Formula based on R defined in Table 1. 
Exposure metric. Let B={bi} represent a set of Boolean variables. Let TB represent a truth 
assignment of these variables such that bi=true ? the signed document doci is published. We note 
EX(TB) a function representing the exposure of the associated published document set. Exposure is 
proportional to financial cost for service providers, and privacy harm for the user. 
We use EXcard(TB) = |{ bi?B: TB(bi)=true }|, a simple function that counts the number of documents 
exposed, as exposure metric for the rest of the article. Note that information loss metrics can be 
assumed proportional to EXcard.
Table 2(a). Rule Set Boolean Formula for the loan 
scenario
Table 2(b). Algorithm notations using the loan 
scenario
B = {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9, b10} such that: 
?i ?[1;10], bi=true ? document doci is exposed.
The Rule Set Boolean Formula ER is as follows:
ER =  ( (b1 ? b2 ) ? (b3 ? b4) ) 
? ( (b5 ? b6 ? b7 ) ? (b4 ? b8 ? b9) ) 
? ( (b1 ? b6 ? b7 ) ? (b2 ? b4 ? b10) ) 
? ( (b2 ? b5 ? b6? b7)? (b1 ? b4 ? b8? b9 ) ) 
Suppose that the user owns in fact documents 1-9 
only we prune out all the classes and atomic rules that 
can not be proven: 
ER =  ( (b1 ? b2 ) ? (b3 ? b4) ) 
? ( (b5 ? b6 ? b7 ) ? (b4 ? b8 ? b9) ) 
? ( (b1 ? b6 ? b7 )
? ( (b2 ? b5 ? b6? b7)? (b1 ? b4 ? b8? b9 ) ) 
D=10; C=4;
B[] is an array of Booleans of size D such that: 
?i?[1;10], B[i]=true ? document di is exposed
R[] is an array of C collection rules;
R[j].atom[] for j?[1;4] are arrays of 2 atomic rules; 
R[j].atom[k].b[] with j?[1;4], k?[1;2] are arrays of 
references to B[i] elements. We denote by *B[i] a








3.1.2 Minimum Exposure Problem 
Using these definitions and notations, we can now define the Minimum Exposure decision problem 
of a set of documents datau with regards to a rule set R and an exposure metric EX. Note that with 
no loss of generality, we suppose that datau proves R. Should this not be the case, we would simply 
use R’ the subset of rules of R proven by datau. Our goal is to find a truth assignment TB of the 
Boolean variables associated to the publication of the documents minimizing their exposure 
computed using EX.
PROBLEM 1. Boolean Minimum Exposure (ME) decision problem:
Given  a rule set R, datau={doci} a set of q signed documents that uniquely proves R, B a set of 
Boolean variables B={b1,..,bq} such that bi=true ? doci is exposed, ER=?j (?k (?m bj,k,m )) where 
?j,k,m bj,k,m?B the rule set formula associated to R, and the exposure function EX, datau is n-
exposable with regards to R if and only if there exists a truth assignment TB of B such that EX(TB) ?
n and ER is true.
Example: Considering the Rule Set R and the set of signed documents datau defined in Table 1, we 
see that datau proves R. Moreover, datau is 5-exposable with regards to R and exposure metric 
EXcard since the truth assignment TB={b1=T, b2=T, b3=F, b4=F, b5=T, b6=T, b7=T, b8=F, b9=F,
b10=F} satisfies ER and EXcard(TB)=5.
We study the ME optimization problem which consists in finding the smallest n for which a set of 
signed documents is n-exposable with regards to given rule set R and exposure function EXcard.
3.2 Complexity Results 
3.2.1 Complexity Analysis 
We analyze here the complexity and approximability of the ME problem. Our results concern both 
polynomial time approximation algorithms [32] and differential approximation [19]14.
THEOREM 1.
All Positive Min Weighted SAT decision (resp. optimization) problem is reducible to ME decision 
(resp. optimization) problem. 
PROOF. The Min Weighted Sat decision (resp. optimization) problem is defined in [5] as follows:  
“Given an integer n, an instance {Pj,k} of P Boolean variables, a CNF formula F=?j ( ?k Pj,k ) ) 
over {Pj,k} and a (positive) weight function w:{Pj,k}?R+, find a truth assignment T for {Pj,k} that 
satisfies F such that w(T)= ?j,k w(Pj,k)?T(Pj,k)  is <n (resp. is minimum).” 
When the formula contains no negative variables, the problem is called All Positive Min Weighted 
Sat (APMWS). The ME decision (resp. optimization) problem considers a formula  
E=?j (?k (?m bj,k,m)). An APMWS instance can be mapped to a ME decision (resp. optimization) 
instance by choosing ?j,k: m=1 and bj,k,1=Pj,k (i.e., all the atomic rules contain only one predicate). 
Any solution to the ME decision (resp. optimization) problem (i.e., find a minimum truth assignment 
to bj,k,1 such that ER is true) will be a solution for APMWS by choosing Pj,k=bj,k,1?
COROLLARY 1.
ME decision problem is NP-Complete.
PROOF. Given THEOREM 1, since APMWS is NP-Complete, the result is immediate. 
COROLLARY 2.
ME optimization problem is NP-Hard, is not in APX15, and has a differential approximation ratio of 
0-DAPX16.
PROOF. Complexity results are a direct consequence of the fact that the APMWS optimization 
problem is reducible to the ME optimization problem, and has negative complexity results. In [5], 
Theorem 6 states that the APMWS problem is not in APX, which leads to the fact that ME is not in 
APX either. [19] studies the APMWS problem, but from a differential approximation angle, and 
shows that the problem is of class 0-DAPX as defined in [11]. Therefore the ME optimization 
problem is in 0-DAPX. ?
3.2.2 Solving the ME Problem 
                                                     
14 Given an instance I of an optimization problem, and a feasible solution S of I, we denote m(I,S) the value of solution S, opt(I) the value 
of an optimal solution of I and W(I) the value of a worst solution of I. The differential approximation ratio of S is defined by 
DR(I,S)=abs((m(I,S)–W(S))/(opt(I)–W(I)). The traditional approximation ratio for a minimization problem is simply defined by 
m(I,S)/opt(I).
15 APX is the class of NP optimization problems that allow polynomial-time approximation algorithms with an approximation ratio 
bounded by a constant.
16 0-DAPX is the class of NP optimisation problems for which all polynomial approximation algorithms have a differential approximation
ratio of 0.
COROLLARY 2 is a negative complexity result in the sense that it shows that the problem is difficult 
and that polynomial approximation algorithms will provide bad approximation guarantees in the 
worst case. In Section 4, we examine the problem by (experimentally) exploring the domain where 
it is possible to provide an exact resolution using a state of the art solver. When such a resolution is 
not possible (too long to compute), we rely on polynomial approximation algorithms. 
3.3 Problem Generalization 
We have considered in Section 3.1 the case where data producers can provide the user with 
documents made of a single attribute = value predicate (signed at this granularity). In a more 
general setting the problem can be expressed as follows, using any exposure metric EXDOC defined 
on a set of documents:  
PROBLEM 2. Generalized Minimum Exposure decision problem 
Given a rule set R, datau={doci} a set of signed documents of the form doci=a?v where a?A,
v?dom(a) and ???????????????????} that proves a rule set R, and an exposure function EXDOC. We 
say that datau is n-exposable with regards to R if we can find dmin? datau such that dmin proves R and 
EXDOC(dmin)? n.
In such a setting, each predicate in the rule set can potentially be proven by several documents (e.g., 
a user might have a document claiming salary>$1.000 and another claiming salary>$3.000). We 
say that we have a mismatch between collection predicates and documents. This general problem 
and some ideas towards its resolution are presented in Appendix A. 
4. SOLUTIONS OF THE ME PROBLEM
In this section, we provide exact and approximation algorithms to compute a solution of the ME
problem. For the exact resolution, we use a Binary Integer Programming (BIP) state of the art 
solver. For the approximate resolution, we propose a naïve random algorithm, a simulated annealing 
based meta-heuristics algorithm, and a ME specific heuristic algorithm.  
In all algorithms, we consider a Boolean formula ER constructed as explained in Section 3 using a
rule set R composed of a set of C collection rules associated with classes (or benefits) that the user 
can (and wants) to claim, and where each atomic rule can be proven using her documents (atomic 
rules that cannot be proven are pruned before constructing R). The size of datau, the user document 
set related to the rule set, is denoted by D.
TB is a truth assignment function to datau that we implement as an array of Booleans with the 
semantics B[i]=true ? doci is exposed. The rule set is represented as an array R[] of C collection 
rules, each collection rule R[i] being an array atom[] of atomic rules, each atomic rule R[i].atom[j]
being an array b[] of references to the elements of B (see example in Table 2(b)). Note that ER is 
true when each collection rule R[i] has at least one atomic rule where all referenced Boolean 
elements are true.
4.1 Exact Resolution (BIP model) 
We propose to use a state of the art BIP solver, generally termed as Mixed Integer Non-Linear 
Program (MINLP) solver, to produce an exact result. We have chosen the popular and open source 
COUENNE solver [12] to this respect.  
In order to use a MINLP solver, an instance of the problem must be written as a MINLP program. 
This is a direct transformation where each document corresponds to a Boolean variable, where the 
objective function is simply the sum of all the variables, and in which we express one non-linear
constraint per collection rule rj:
rj: ?k ?m docj,k,m ? 1 
The running example presented in Section 2.3 can be expressed by the following program, written 
in AMPL [21]: 




r1: b1*b2 + b3*b4 >= 1; 
r2: b5*b6*b7 + b4*b8*b9 >= 1; 
r3: b1*b6*b7 + b2*b4*b10 >= 1; 
r4: b2*b5*b6*b7 + b1*b4*b8*b9 >= 1; 
The program is then fed to the BIP solver. As shown in Section 5, the range of parameters for which 
the BIP solver computes the solution in an acceptable time (under 10 minutes) is small. 
4.2 Approximate Solutions (Polynomial Time) 
We need to revert to a polynomial time approximation in order to compute results for the instances 
of the problem that cannot be tackled within reasonable time by the solver. We propose three 
algorithms: a naïve fully random algorithm called RAND*, a simulated annealing meta-heuristics 
based algorithm called SA*, and an algorithm called HME using a heuristic specially designed for 
the ME problem. These algorithms are non deterministic, therefore they can be run many times and 
the best solution is kept. However, they produce their first result in linear or polynomial time, 
depending on the algorithm. We discuss the complexity of the algorithms on a single run, to 
compare their speed. To compare their quality, we run the longest algorithm (HME) once, and we 
execute the other algorithms (RAND* and SA*) as many times as necessary, until they run out of 
processor time. 
4.2.1 Fully Random Algorithm 
We first introduce the RAND* algorithm (see Algorithm 1), based on a random choice of rules. 
RAND* serves as a baseline to be compared with the (smarter) algorithms presented next.
RAND* randomly chooses one atomic rule for each collection rule and sets to true the value of each 
Boolean in B that this atomic rules refers to. Since each class is covered, the corresponding set of 
documents determined by the truth assignment B is a solution to the ME problem instance. The 
result is the solution found within the allocated time limit for which EXcard is minimum (best 
result). The algorithm complexity is O(C ? MAXatom(atom.length) + D) where 
MAXatom(atom.length) is the length of the longest atomic rule involved. This algorithm therefore 
provides an approximate solution in polynomial (linear) time. Since this algorithm is 
straightforward, we do not provide its code.
4.2.2 Simulated Annealing Algorithm 
Meta-heuristics are used in optimization problems in order to guide the algorithm towards better 
solutions, instead of simply randomly selecting them. We consider here simulated annealing [24] 
and introduce the SA* algorithm to serve as a representative for meta-heuristic guided algorithms.  
A first parameter function of the meta-heuristic is neighbour(B) which randomly chooses one class 
and randomly chooses a different atomic rule for this class17. For the second parameter function, as 
proposed in [24], we define temp(i)=0.9 i ? 10 and P(E,Enew,T)=1 if Enew < E, and exp((E?Enew) / T)
otherwise. We use EXcard to have an energy function in the same range as the one proposed for the 
Traveling Salesman Problem. 
SA* (Simulated Annealing) algorithm 
Input:  R a Rule set 
 N a number of runs 
M a number of cooling iterations 
Ouput:  Bbest a truth assignment of the documents that 
proves R
1. for i = 1 to D do
2.  Bbest[i] ? true
3. endfor
4. for i=1 to N do 
5.   B ? SA(M, RAND*(R, 1)) 
6.   if EXcard(B) < EXcard(Bbest) then 
7.     Bbest?B
8. endfor
9. return Sbest
As in the case of RAND* algorithm, SA* algorithm provides a solution in polynomial (linear) time 
of complexity O(M+D), disregarding the initial initialization phase that uses RAND*.
                                                     
17 This means maintaining for a truth assignment B the atomic rules that compose it, in order to easily perform the switch.
Function SA 
Input:  M a number of cooling iterations
 B0 an initial truth assignment  





4. Ebest? E 
5. for i= 1 to M do 
6.  Bnew? neighbour(B) 
7.  Enew? EXcard(Bnew)*D
8.  if P(E, Enew, temp(i)) > random() then 
9.   B ? Bnew
10.   E ? Enew
11.   if Enew < Ebest then
12.    Bbest?Bnew
13.    Ebest? Enew
14.   endif 
15.  endif 
16. endfor
17. return Bbest
4.2.3 The HME Algorithm 
The Heuristic for Minimum Exposure (HME) algorithm that we propose uses a specific heuristic for 
the ME problem. We show how it works on an example, and we discuss its complexity.  
The heuristic lies in the computation of score[i] the score of the ith Boolean entry in B, using the 
function fix(B). This function computes a lower bound of the value of EXcard, by computing the 
number of predicates that can no longer be set to false for the given B. For instance, suppose that 
B[i]=false (i.e., doci is not published). All the atomic rules referring to B[i] cannot be proven 
anymore. This leads to the fact that EXcard will be greater (or equal) to the value of the cardinality 
of the set of predicates in the atomic rules that are the only ones left to prove a given class. Using 
the running example (see Section 2.3), we illustrate the computation of fix(B) in Table 3 for each 
Boolean entry at each step of the algorithm. Let us briefly see how score[1] and score[3] are 
computed for the first step. If B[1]=false, then we have to prove collection rules R[1], R[3], R[4]
using respectively atomic rules R[1].atom[2], R[3].atom[2], R[4].atom[1] (i.e., which means 
setting to true the 7 Booleans B[2], B[3], B[4], B[5], B[6], B[7], B[10]), leading to score[1]=7. If 
B[3]=false, this means proving R[1] using R[1].atom[1] (i.e., set to true the 2 Booleans B[1],
B[2]), therefore score[3]=2. We show in grey the lowest score, which means a truth assignment set 
to false in next steps, indicated by the symbol ?. Documents for which the score is denoted by ? are 
those for which the final truth assignment is set to true. The final result is here B=[B[1]=true,
B[2]=true, B[3]=false, B[4]=false, B[5]=true, B[6]=true, B[7]=true, B[8]=false, B[9]=false,
B[10]=false] which happens to be the minimal value of EXcard on this instance of the problem. 
HME algorithm 
Input: ER a Rule Set Boolean Formula 
Ouput: B a truth assignment of the documents that proves R
1.for i = 1 to D do
2. B[i] ? true
3.endfor
4.while ( exists i such that: B[i]=true and  
     if B[i] is set to false then ER (B) remains true) do 
5. for i = 1 to D do  
6.  score[i] ??
7. endfor 
8. forall i such that B[i] = true do  
9.  B[i] ? false 
10.   if ER (B)=true then // ER (B) is true iff B proves R 
11.    score[i] ? fix(B)
12.   endif 
13.   B[i] ? true 
14.  endforall 
15.  m ? i such that score[i] is minimum 
16.  B[m] ? false 
17. endwhile
18. return B 
































1: score[i] 7 7 2 5 4 ? 6 4 4 3
2: score [i] ? ? ? 5 5 ? 6 5 5 4
3: score [i] ? ? ? 5 7 ? ? 5 5 ?
4: score [i] ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 5 5 ?
5: score [i] ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 5 ?
Final B[i] true true false false true true true false false false
We see that the cost of HME algorithm is proportional to O(COSTFIX?D2), where COSTFIX is the 
cost of computing the fix function. More precisely, in our implementation, COSTFIX = O(C?dR?dQD),
where dR is the number of atomic rules per collection rule and dQD is the number of predicates per 
atomic rule (see Section 5 for more precisions concerning these notations). 
The intuition behind the heuristic is to successively get rid of the documents which require keeping 
the least number of other documents (such that all benefits are preserved) among the remaining 
ones. This heuristic is particularly relevant when the number of atoms per collection rule is small. 
Our performance evaluation confirms this scope. Note that if this number increases then HME tends 
towards RAND.
We show in Section 5 that the HME algorithm provides very good results in terms of quality of 
approximation, while maintaining reasonable computational complexity. We show in Appendix A 
that the HME algorithm can be easily extended to documents containing predicates of the form 
attribute ??value, with ???{?????????????????}.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present an experimental validation of our approach. Its objective is twofold: (1) 
to show that the gain on the exposure metric is significant when using exact algorithms or 
approximation algorithms; (2) to show that the approach is scalable in the sense that approximation 
algorithms still achieve good gains when exact algorithms become too costly. We first present the 
parameters of the experiments. We then provide the results of our experiments and draw the main 
conclusions. Algorithms, data and BIP model generator code are available18.
5.1 Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Platform, Metrics and Algorithms  
Experiments were conducted on a HP workstation with 3.1MHz Intel CPU and 8GB RAM running 
Java1.6 (x64). The COUENNE solver was run on the same machine. We consider the algorithms 
given in Table 4 (details in Section 4). 
Table 4. Algorithms used in the experiments 
COUENNE
Computes the exact solution using the COUENNE 
solver, within a time limit (2 hours).  
RAND* 
Selects the best random solution found within a time 
limit (same execution time as HME).
SA* 
Finds a solution using simulated annealing within a 
time limit (same execution time as HME).
HME Selects the best solution using an ad-hoc heuristic. 
The exposure metric that we use is EXcard as defined in Section  3.1.1 In the figures that follow, we 
measure the exposure reduction obtained using that metric, representing the percentile reduction of 
the number of documents exposed compared with classical server-side limited collection techniques 
                                                     
18 See http://www-smis.inria.fr/~anciaux/MinExp 
(i.e., where all the documents involved in the collection rules are exposed). Exposure reduction is 
denoted ER and is computed by:
ER(TB)=1 – EXcard(TB)/|B|
5.1.2 Synthetic Problem Generator
Privacy related data sets are inherently scarce to obtain. Thus we chose to build a tunable generator 
to produce many possible problems (user data and rule sets). To fix the parameters around realistic 
values, we used the characteristics of real decision trees obtained from [10] in the case of credit risk 
assessment. These decision trees were extracted from neural networks built on real credit risk
datasets. To model the data generated used as input of the algorithms, we introduce a bipartite graph
representation. We discuss below its parameters.
r1:  (p1 ? p2 ) ? (p3 ? p4)
r2:  (p5 ? p6 ? p7 )
? (p4 ? p8 ? p9)
r3:  (p1 ? p6 ? p7)
? (p2 ? p4 ? p10)
r4:  (p2 ? p5 ? p6? p7 )
? (p1 ? p4 ? p8? p9 )
Each predicate pi is proven 
by document di:
?i?[1;10], di ? pi
R = { r1, r2, r3, r4 }
D = { d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7,d8,d9,d10}
Q = { q1=(p1 ? p2 ), q2=(p3 ? p4),
q3=(p5 ? p6 ? p7 ), q4=(p4 ? p8 ? p9),
q5= (p1 ? p6 ? p7), q6=(p2 ? p4 ? p10),
q7= (p2 ? p5 ? p6? p7 ),
q8=(p1 ? p4 ? p8? p9 ) }
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8
r1 r2 r3 r4
Figure 2. Loan scenario (left) and Bipartite graph (right) 
We introduce three sets of nodes: R={ri} the set of (provable) collection rules where ri implies class 
ci, Q={qi} the set of (provable) atomic rules involved in the collection rules and D={di} the set of
documents held by the user which can prove all the predicates involved in the rules. We also 
introduce two sets of edges. EQR is the set of edges between Q and R. Each vertex in EQR is 
interpreted as the fact that if the atomic rule is true (i.e., proven), the collection rule to which it 
belongs is also true. EQD is the set of edges between Q and D. Each edge in EQD is interpreted as the 
fact that if the document is false (i.e., not exposed), the atomic rule to which it belongs is also false.
We have D?Q=?, R?Q=? and R?D=?, and we note GD,Q,R = (D?R, Q, EQD?EQR) which forms a 
bipartite graph. Our running example is illustrated using the bipartite graph representation in Figure
2.
To define a graph, we need to fix the average out degrees of nodes in D and R, noted dD (the 
average number of atomic rules a document belongs to) and dR (the average number of atomic rules 
in a collection rule), and the average out degrees of nodes in Q towards each subset of partition 
D?R noted dQD (the average number of document predicates in an atomic rule) and dQR (the average 
number of collection rules an atomic rule leads to). In our representation, we fix dQR=1, i.e., an 
atomic rule leads to only one class. Note that this still captures the case in which two "identical" 
atomic rules lead to two different classes: those two atomic rules will simply be represented as two 
different nodes in Q, having the same set of document predicates in D and leading to different 
classes in R.
Considering our notations, the following relations hold:
(1) |EQD| = |D|?dD = |Q|?dQD
(2) |EQR| = |Q| = |R|?dR
We see that by fixing the quadruplet (|D|, dD, |R|, dR) we can uniquely determine |Q| and dQD. We 
call such a quadruplet the generator of a dataset. While it would be possible to choose a different 
quadruplet, we chose these attributes because we feel their semantics are easier to understand. For 
instance the dataset shown in Figure 2 consists of a set of |R|=4 collection rules, built over |Q|=8
atomic rules with a total of |D|=10 different documents, with an average of dD=2.4 atomic rules per 
document and dR=2 atomic rules per class. The generator of this dataset is therefore (10, 2.4, 4, 2).
Both |Q|=8 and dQD=3 can be computed using equations (1) and (2). 
Based on these considerations we can build a dataset generator algorithm. This algorithm takes as 
input a quadruplet (|D|, dD, |R|, dR). Using these parameters, it constructs D and R, then deduces Q
since |Q|=|R|?dR. It constructs EQD and EQR by generating the out degrees of nodes based on a given 
distribution (Gaussian) and randomly picks a value in this distribution. It then insures that all nodes 
are connected, by switching edges if necessary. The result is a dataset conforming to the generator 
with a given distribution of out degrees.
5.2 Measurements
We run three sets of experiments. Based on the real decision trees built in [10], we consider the 
following topology of the problem in all our experiments: we fix dR =4 (a collection rule is 
composed of 4 atomic rules in the average) and dD =4 (each document is involved on average in 4 
atomic rules) and vary |D| and/or |R|. Each measure is the average of several repeated experiments to 
reduce statistical bias (each measure is repeated 100 times except those lasting longer than 1
minute, where we ran them 10 times). The experiments are: 
Experiment 1: increasing documents only. We vary the number of documents necessary to prove 
the predicates involved in the rule set and we fix all other parameters. We consider 10 collection 
rules. Regarding the input parameters of the data generator, we vary |D| and fix |R|=10, dR=4 and 
dD=4. COUENNE is given a time limit of 2 hours. RAND* and SA* are given processor time 
equivalent to one execution of HME on the same instance. Note that execution time of 
approximation algorithms is always less than 10 minutes here. Results are presented in Figure 3 
(shows the exposure reduction ER) and 4 (shows the execution time).  
Experiment 2: increasing collection rules only. We vary the number of collection rules and we 
consider 1000 documents, i.e., the fixed parameters are |D|=1000, dR=4 and dD=4. In this case, in 
order to be able to scale |R| we need to choose a sufficiently large value for |D|. Again, RAND* and 
SA* are given the same processor time as one execution of HME (always less than 10 minutes). 
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Figure 3. ER varying the number of documents 
Figure 4. Execution time varying number of 
documents
Experiment 3: increasing documents and collection rules. We vary the numbers of collection rules 
and documents, keeping a constant ratio of |D|/|R|=4. We fix dR=4 and dD=4. This measure shows 
the behavior of the algorithms when the dataset increases, with a stable problem topology. Figure 6
plots the results. 
The main conclusions that we draw from the experiments are: 
The exposure reduction ER is (almost always) important. The algorithms, depending on the 
parameters of the problem, enable a reduction of the number of documents to be exposed ranging 
from 30% to 80% compared with traditional implementations of the limited collection principle. In
the area of applicability of exact solutions, the reduction is of nearly 70% on average. Of course, the 
expected reduction may vary depending on the input dataset, but to give a rough idea of the results 
that can be expected, the average exposure reduction in all the experiments (considering for each
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Figure 5. ER varying number of collection rules
Figure 6. ER varying number of documents & 
collection rules 
The scope of exact solution is limited. As expected, COUENNE which computes an exact solution 
consumes far too much time when the size of the problem increases. Within the time limit that was 
chosen, the result cannot be computed with more than 120 documents in Experiment 1, 1 collection 
rule in Experiment 2, and 15 collection rules in Experiment 3. Note that giving a time limit bigger 
than 2 hours would not change much since the execution time grows exponentially with the size of 
the problem. With 200 documents in Experiment 1, and with 2 collection rules in Experiment 2,
COUENNE needs nearly 10 hours. The use of approximation algorithms is therefore unavoidable in 
order to obtain results for a broad spectrum of parameters. 
HME is the best approximation algorithm. The exposure reduction obtained using HME is higher 
than those obtained with RAND* or SA*. Results presented in Figures 3, 5 and 6 show that the HME
algorithm outperforms the RAND* and SA* algorithms in this range of parameters, with a 
significant 10% relative gain.
To conclude, implementing the limited data collection principle using Minimum Exposure provides 
very significant gains in terms of reduction of the exposed documents and is scalable. 
6. RELATED WORK 
The transposition of legal privacy principles into privacy aware computing systems has fostered 
many studies during the last decade. Emblematic examples include the P3P Platform for Privacy 
Preferences [15], the emergence of privacy policy languages like EPAL [9] and Hippocratic
databases [3]. P3P transposes the well known need-to-know and consent principles. Web sites can 
describe their practices in a machine readable format, which are automatically compared by the web 
browser to the consent given by the user. While P3P highlights conflicting policies, it offers no 
means to calibrate the data exposed by a user to a given service. In the last years, many other policy 
languages have been proposed for different application scenarios, including EPAL [9], XACML 
[28] and WSPL [7]. For example, WSPL (Web Services Policy Language) aims at describing and 
controlling various features of web services. To the best of our knowledge, no language has been 
introduced with limited data collection in mind. But studying possible support of minimum 
exposure with such languages is part of our future work.
Hippocratic databases [3] are another emblematic example of privacy aware systems. They are 
inspired by the axiom that databases should be responsible for the privacy preservation of the data 
they manage. The architecture of a Hippocratic database is based on ten guiding principles derived 
from privacy laws including limited data collection. However, limited data collection is 
implemented on server side and by nature falls into the paradox presented in the introduction. 
Interestingly, open problems associated with LDC are mentioned in [3] but left unsolved. The 
authors point out for example the problem of implementing the limited data collection principle 
whether attributes are needed (or not) depending on the values of other attributes. Our proposal 
helps resolving those problems.  
Recent privacy studies enhance access control policies to bridge the gap with privacy policies. In 
particular, obligations are introduced [29], as well as actions to perform after the data has been 
obtained like notification or removal [8] and purpose binding features [14], [25]. Recently, the 
widely used RBAC model has been extended to support privacy policies [30]. A natural distinction 
holds between ME and access control. Indeed, in the context of ME, potential third parties (a bank 
or a social organization) are not known in advance, they can potentially be many, and the minimum 
subset of personal data to expose must be defined according to the claimed benefits and the personal 
data at disposal (the more documents at disposal, the more alternatives to obtain the desired 
benefits). This goes far beyond the scope of traditional access control techniques. Existing works 
closer to our study can be found in the area of credential based access control, where access 
decisions are based on the confrontation of an access control policy with a set of credentials. In this 
area, both the policy and credentials are private, and thus most contributions use secure multiparty 
computing techniques to reach the decision, and therefore do not scale. A few number of works 
including [39, 40, 41] in this area can however be considered as following a minimum exposure 
approach. All those works minimize the privacy leak of a set of personal data items (credentials) 
while enabling a given decision to be made (the grant or deny access decision). Those contributions 
can be seen as vanguards in the strict application of the LDC principle for decision making systems. 
However, the problem and solutions are different for two founding reasons. First, the decision 
making processes that we consider are more complex than access control. The collection rules in 
ME can model sets of decision trees classifiers: several dimensions can be considered (e.g., lower 
credit rate, longer duration, lower cost of insurance, larger portion of 0% loan, etc.) each one 
potentially impacting the final offer made to the applicant. Second, in our context, the decision 
making process requires by nature a huge amounts of personal data (e.g., to obtain a loan offer 
customers are asked to fill in forms with hundreds to thousands fields), while in access control only 
a few credentials are considered (e.g., up to 35 in [39]). The results of these works can therefore not 
be used in our context, because they fall short on both the expressivity of the problem, and its 
scalability requirement. 
Works dealing with Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) also take a different direction than 
ME. Recent PPDM surveys [2], [20] refer neither to ME type problems nor to their legal foundation 
(i.e., the LDC principle). Unlike ME, techniques protecting individual records with regards to the 
input of a data mining algorithm [4], [26], turn original data into encrypted or randomly perturbed 
data, which becomes unverifiable. On the contrary, ME preserves the original data and its ability to 
be verified by a third party (a signature guarantees its integrity and origin). Another aspect of 
PPDM techniques is that they try to protect sensitive rules (i.e., the output of a data mining 
algorithm) by removing raw data [1], [37]. However, these techniques maximize the information 
retained in the output data set, so long as the private results remain secret, whereas the goal of ME is 
to minimize it. Note that this approach is nevertheless compatible with ME. Indeed, the former 
(PPDM) would remove sensitive data upstream and the latter (ME) could minimize the remaining 
information, thereby guaranteeing maximal privacy.  
Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [22] are also closely related to the ME problem. Indeed, 
PPDP focuses on publishing original raw data rather than data mining results or statistics. However, 
subsequent treatments are not known at the time of data publishing. In ME, the knowledge of these 
treatments is a prerequisite to identify the minimum subset of data to be exposed. Furthermore, 
PPDP tries to balance privacy gain and data utility, sometimes with difficulties [13], while ME
preserves the full utility of the data (complete set of due benefits are obtained). Some PPDP 
techniques like [18], closer to statistical databases can be assimilated to (advanced) access control, 
where statistical data is exposed without revealing individual values.
7. CONCLUSION AND FURTURE WORKS
In this article, we have introduced the Minimum Exposure approach and the related ME problem. 
We have shown how it can be expressed in the form of a Boolean minimum weighted satisfiability 
problem. We have studied the scope of applicability of general operational research solutions, using 
a state of the art MINLP solver. For cases where an exact resolution was not applicable, we have 
proposed several algorithms to compute an approximation of the solution. In all cases, we have 
shown that the exposure reduction that can be achieved compared with traditional implementations 
of limited data collection is around 50% in the average. These benefits are not only interesting for 
the user, whose privacy is less exposed, but also for the service providers who can limit their losses 
in the event of a data breach.
Our hope is to open a new avenue for interesting applications of the minimal exposure principle 
introduced in this paper. For example, collective treatments, e.g., data mining tasks or distributed 
queries, could be addressed to achieve minimal exposure constraints. The result could be computed 
progressively, each participant would dynamically determine a minimum set of local documents 
remaining to be delivered in order to compute the final result, given some feedback on intermediate 
results. The approach proposed in this paper could be used as a first step towards achieving 
"minimally exposed" global computation. 
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APPENDIX A: PROBLEM EXTENSION 
The results presented in this article can be extended to the cases where users official documents are 
composed of sets of predicates a?v where ???????????????????}. This means the same attribute may 
potentially be contained in distinct documents (e.g., doca: salary>$1.000 and docb: salary>$2.000).
This means that there is no longer just one document that can prove a given predicate, and therefore 
there is no longer and equivalence between computing the solution to ME and the truth value of the 
Rule Set Boolean Formula as described in Section 3.1. Instead, a more complex formula E'R must be 
computed, where each rule is replaced by the disjunction of the Boolean variables representing the 
multiple documents proving it: 
PROBLEM 3. Multi-proof Boolean Minimum Exposure (MPME) 
Given a rule set R, datau={doci} a set of q signed documents that proves R, B a set of Boolean 
variables B={b1,..,bq} such that bi=true ? doci is exposed, E’R=?j??k???m(?q bj,k,m,t))) where ?j,k,m,t
bj,k,m,t?B, and the exposure function EX’, datau is  
n-exposable with regards to R if and only if there exists a truth assignment TB of B such that 
EX’(TB) ? n and E’R is true.
In what follows, we consider the related MPME optimization problem whose goal is to minimize n.
It is straightforward that ME is reducible to MPME, since it is a special case of MPME where ?j,k,m
t=1. Therefore, the hardness results of COROLLARY 1 and 2 also hold for PROBLEM 3.
Let us stress that if the user documents uniquely prove the rule set, then PROBLEM 1 and PROBLEM 3 are 
equivalent (t can only take value 1). In general, this will not be the case and PROBLEM 3 will have to 
be solved, which is at least as hard as PROBLEM 1. We show next that both problems can be solved in 
a similar way.  
Roughly speaking, this simply requires adapting the EXcard function to take into account the fact 
that, e.g., salary>$50.000 is less costly if a breach occurs than salary=$61.000, and choosing for 
each predicate the document with lowest cost. To this end, we introduce EXPRED, a function 
computing the cost of a given predicate p=a?v, where dom(a) is finite:
if ?????}: EXPRED(p)  = 1
And if??????????????????}:
 EXPRED (a?v) = 1 – |{x?dom(a): x?v}| / |dom(a)|?
and EX’card a function computing the exposure of a set of predicates on the published attributes of 
A by summing the maximum value of their exposure: 
EX’card (B)=? a?published attributes MAX p = a?v (EXPRED (p))
By using EX’card as objective function and by choosing for each pi the single document docj,k,m
minimizing EX’card that proves it (obviously we disregard two identical documents), each predicate 
in the rule set can be replaced by the unique document predicate minimizing EX'card and therefore a 
solution to the MPME problem can be computed by solving PROBLEM 1. We show next how the HME
algorithm runs with EX’card instead of EXcard.
The idea is to change the fix( ) function to use EXPRED and EX’card: the function now computes a 
minimum bound on the value of EX’card if a document is not sent. In this example, we suppose that 
the problem involves three different predicates on salary. The new predicates are p11: salary
>$10.000, p12: salary>$20.000, p13: salary>$30.000. The rule set is as follows:
r1:  (p11 ? p2) ? (p3 ? p4) ? c1
r2: (p5 ? p6 ? p7)? (p4 ? p8 ? p9) ? c2
r3: (p12 ? p6 ? p7 ) ? (p2 ? p4 ? p10) ? c3
r4: (p2 ? p5 ? p6? p7) ? (p13 ? p4 ? p8? p9) ? c4
In order to compute EXPRED, we suppose for instance that a salary is in the domain [0; 100.000]. 
Therefore, EXPRED(p11) = 0.3, EXPRED(p12) = 0.2 and EXPRED(p13) = 0.1. For all other predicates p,
EXPRED(p)=1. Also note that since p13?p12 and p13?p11 setting p13 to false means that setting p11 to
false while leaving p13 to true will provide no breach cost improvement, since this information can 
be inferred. However, p13 can be set to false while p11 and p12 could remain true, which would 
provide the exposure gain EXPRED(p11)-EXPRED(p12)=0.1. Concerning the fix( ) function note that 
removing p13 only fixes predicates p2, p5, p6, and p7.
In Table 5, we show an execution of the HME algorithm computing fix( ) for each step. The result is 
TB=[p11:true, p12:true, p13:false, p2:true, p3:false, p4:false, p5:true, p6:true, p7:true, p8:false, p9:false,
p10:false], and the value of EX’card(TB)=4.2. Compared to the example presented in Table 2, the 
same truth assignment was found for predicates p2 through p10 and the algorithm was also able to set 
p13 to false, while keeping p12 and p11 true, thus slightly reducing data exposure: instead of exposing 
salary=$35.000 the user will expose salary>$20.000.
Table 5. Execution of the HME Algorithm (signed predicates). 
Steps p11 p12 p13 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10
1:score 7 6 4 4.2 1.1 4.1 3.3 ??? 5.3 4 4 0
2:score ? 6.1 4.1 ? ? 4.2 4.3 ??? 5.3 4.1 4.1 3.2
3:score ? ? 4.2 ? ? 4.2 4.3 ? ? 4.2 4.2 ?
4:score ? ? ? ? ? 4.2 ? ? ? 4.2 4.2 ?
5:score ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 4.2 4.2 ?
6:score ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 4.2 ?
7:B[i] true true false true false false true true true false false false 
